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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Declaratory Judgment action seeking construetion of the provisions of Sections 39-1-35 and 39-3-2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by all parties
and were argued before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor on
December 15, 1978.

The Court entered its Order on February

2, 1979, granting defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
and denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the Order entered on February
2, 1979, by Judge G. Hal Taylor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents basically accept the statement of facts submitted by Appellant except for the assertion that "several
other agencies, organizations and governmental subdivisions
had similar policies of supplementing pay of individuals on
military leave."

As to governmental subdivisions or agencies

this is obviously not true in the State of Utah and respondents respectfully take issue with such allegation.
POINT I
WASATCH FRONT IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS
39-l-35 OR 39-3-2, uTAH CODE Affi.OTATED, 1953.
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Appellant argues that employees of Wasatch Front Regional
Council are not state employees for purposes of either sections 39-l-35 or 39-3-2 of the Utah Code.
of Appellant's Brief)

(See Point III

Section 11-13-1 of the Utah Code

specifically states that a separate legal entity formed
pursuant to the Act (Utah Interlocal Cooperation Act) is
deemed a "political subdivision of the State."
Appellant refers to Section 11-13-3 and specifically
the definition of "public agency" and then asserts that since
that term includes all political subdivisions of the State
that respondents are asserting that the employees of a "pub·

lie agency" are "state employees" and that this is an absurc
result since it would make employees of all "public agencies'
state employees.

This is a case of setting up a "straw man" so it can be
demolished with no reference to the actual argument advancec
by respondents.
Since Wasatch Front is specifically defined to be a
"political subdivision of the State," employees thereof are
either "state employees," or employees of a "political sub·

division of the State."

The member organizations of Wasatc~

Front are "political subdivisions" of the State and in this
case, either municipalities or counties.

It is logical to

-2- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

assume that the employees of Wasatch Front would fall into
the category of either "municipal" or "county employees."
The fact is that Section 11-13-24 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
seems to imply this by stating that officers and employees
of contracting agencies "shall be deemed officers and employees of said public agencies."

In the case of Wasatch

Front, the "contracting agencies" are either municipalities
(cities) or counties and thus subject to the obligations
imposed on cities and counties including specifically the
requirement to pay military leave pay.

To conclude other-

wise would lead to an "absurd" result.

For instance, if a

city desired to relieve itself of certain responsibilities
it could presumably enter into a contract with another "public agency" under the Interlocal Act and employ that agency
to perform city services without the necessity of performing
any requirements or responsibilities the city felt were burdensome, onerous or otherwise disadvantageous to the city.

Cer-

tainly the Legislature in adopting the Interlocal Cooperation
Act did not intend it to be a vehicle for "public agencies"
to circumvent the law and legal requirements otherwise applicable to a "public agency."
Respondents submit that employees of Wasatch Front either
qualify as "state employees" by virtue of Section 11-13-1 or
they fall into the category of employees of a "city or county"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
-3- Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and they would in either event be entitled to the benefits
of "military leave" as provided in Section 39-1-35 or 39-3-11
I

Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

I

Wasatch Front Regional Council is funded by tax revenues I
of cities and counties within the geographical area of
Wasatch Front.

Federal grant in aid money is received as

well under certain federal aid programs.

Respondents soo-

mit that so long as the Board of Directors are made up of
city and county officials and funding is supplied by cities
and counties, there is no justification for a finding that
appellant is not responsible to pay military leave pay as
specified in Section 39-1-35 or Section 39-3-2.
POINT II
SECTION 39-3-2 APPLIES TO THE NATIONAL GUARD AS
WELL AS THE OTHER RESERVE COMPONENTS.
Appellant mistakenly asserts that the National Guard is
not a "reserve component" or that in some way the Legislature intended to create a distinction between the coverage
contemplated in Section 39-3-2 for the "organized reserve"
as it applies to other than state employees and the more
restrictive coverage afforded in Section 39-1-35.
As can be seen by a simple reading of Section 39-1-35,

I

enacted in 1917, the intent of that Section was to encourage I
membership in the National Guard by state employees.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At

that time in our history the National Guard was for all
intents and purposes the "reserve," at least as far as
this State was concerned.

It was also just prior to entry

by the U. S. in World War I when national mobilization was
beginning.

This was one year after the National Congress

passed the National Defense Act of 1916, which among other
things provided for funding of the National Guard by the
United States and provided for its inclusion as a "reserve"
force.

(See 39 Stat. at Large 166)

In 1955 the Legislature obviously recognized the inequity
which then existed of granting military leave only to state
employees who belonged to the National Guard and apparently
decided to extend the benefit of military leave to not only
state employees but to county and municipal employees as
well, and to extend the benefit to members of the "organized
reserve of the

u.s.

Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines."

Since the obvious intent of the Legislature in 1955 was
to extend the scope of military leave and its application,
it is not reasonable to conclude as appellant asserts, that
the Legislature did not intend for 39-3-2 to apply to the
National Guard, as well as the "organized reserve."

If

appellant were correct, it would mean that a National Guardsman employed by a city or county would not be entitled to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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military leave while a fellow employee who was a reservist
would.

This is not reasonable and plainly was not the in-

tent of the Legislature.
Ever since the National Defense Act of 1916, the National I

I

Guard has been funded by the U.S. Government, has trained
pursuant to requirements originating with the

u.s.

Government I

and has been considered within the terms "organized reserve"
or "reserve component" of the United States.

This has been

formalized by definition in the United States Code since
July 9, 1952, when the definition now found in 10 U.S.C.,
was adopted.

(See 66 Stat. at Large 483.)

Obviously, the Utah State Legislature was aware that the
National Guard of the State of Utah, both Army and Air were
included within the category of the "organized reserve of
the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines" when they enacte,:
Section 39-3-2.

To conclude otherwise is totally unrealisti:

In 10 U.S.C., 261 the Reserve Components of the United
States are designated and this designation includes both

we

"Army National Guard of the United States" and "the Air
National Guard of the United States."

These terms are de-

fined in 10 U.S.C. 101 and clearly provide that members of
the National Guard, both Army and Air are also concurrentlY
members of the "Reserve Components."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

There is no difference between a National Guardsman and
a reservist as far as training standards, pay and allowances,
promotion standards or uniform requirements.

The only dis-

tinction is that a guardsman is technically under control
of the Governor while a reservist is not.

To conclude that

the Legislature in enacting 39-3-2 intended to restrict its
application to "members of the organized reserves" without
including the National Guard, or to in any way restrict its
application is not realistic.

They obviously were extending

the benefits of military leave, not restricting it as appellant's position would effectively do.
Appellant is too concerned with trying to distinguish between the language of a statute and terms then used to designate reserve organizations with today's definition of the
"reserve components."

Regardless of name, the Reserve Com-

ponents as defined today in 10 U.S.C. 261, all had their
predecessors, who were designated somewhat differently but
who had essentially the same function.

It is also obvious

that these "reserve organizations" were all intended to be
encompassed within the term used by the State Legislature
in the language now incorporated in 39-3-2 Utah Code Annotated,
1953.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
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POINT III
THE PROVISIONS OF 39-1-35 AND 39-3-2 CAN BE
HARMONIZED.
In addition to the argument set out in Point II of this
brief, respondents allege further that there is no conflict
in fact between Sections 39-3-2 and 39-1-35.

Section

39-~2

is merely an amplification of 39-1-35 and extends the cover·

age already a part of the law to employees of cities or
counties and to "reservists" as opposed to only state employees who belonged to the National Guard.
Appellant's argument about giving both statutes "meaning"
thus defeating benefits to guardsmen employed by cities or
counties was obviously not intended and is an unreasonable
interpretation.

The past practices of Wasatch Front show

this to be the case since they have paid military leave to
guardsmen and even their new clearly erroneous policy of
paying the pay differential does not distinguish between
guardsmen and "reservists."

This Court has commented on

the weight to be given an administrative determination when
a question of statutory interpretation is presented in the
case of Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738

(1977):
Nevertheless, we further observe that
the correctness of the trial court's
decision also finds support in this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-8Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

additional proposition: that in case
of any uncertainty or ambiguity in a
statute, a reasonable administrative
interpretation and practice should be
given some weight, and this is particularly true when such an administrative
intrepetation and practice has persisted
for a long time without any legislative
correction or change.
The Court then went on to state with reference to the long
practice followed by Salt Lake County in this case:
As we have observed in other fields of
the law, if there is to be any abrupt
about-face in policy, that should be
done by the legislature rather than
by the county officials adding in the
self interest of the county.
See also Allison v.

u.s.,

301 F.2d 670 (1962) and cases

cited therein on this proposition.
During the recent General Session of the Utah State Legislature a bill to amend both Sections 39-1-35 and 39-3-2 was
before the House of Representatives as House Bill No. 18.
(See Appendix for copy of Substitute House Bill No. 18 for
reference.)

The main thrust of this Bill was to provide for

payment of only the differential between military pay and
the pay otherwise due the employee from his regular employment as a state, county or municipal employee referred to as
"full pay."

This Bill was debated extensively and soundly

defeated by the House of Representatives.

The Legislature

did not see fit to remove any alleged "ambiguity" between
theSponsored
two bystatutes
in question.
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

While it can be argued that the enactment of Section
39-3-2 renders Section 39-1-35 somewhat unnecessary, it
does not render that section inapplicable, nor does it conflict.

1

It is obvious that 39-3-2 was not intended to con-

flict with 39-1-35 and to adopt .'-l.ppellant's theory as urged
in its argument creates an unreasonable effect and theoreti-1
cally creates a discriminatory effect which was obviously
not intended as already urged.
While the Supreme Court of Utah has not had an

opport~-

ity to speak out as yet with respect to 39-1-35 and 39-3-2
it did have such an opportunity with respect to 39-3-1 in
the Critchlow v. Monson, 102 U. 378,131

P.2d 794

(B42):

One of the apparent objects of the statute
as well as that of similar statutes in other
states, is to have a position or job open to
the ones who are compelled to leave them temporarily because of the call to the armed forces.
Among other things, the act was designed to
aid morale.
. . • The plaintiff has misconceived the objectives of the act. (p. 802,
Pacific Rptr. cite.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
It has long been the law of this state that if there is
I

a lack of clarity in a statute the entire statute should be
looked to and to the purposes for which the statute was
sought to accomplish.
op cit.

I

Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Coun!Y, su:l

The Utah Supreme Court observed:
An even more fundamental rule of statutory

interpretation helpful here is that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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statute should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished.
(Citing authority)
POINT IV
"FULL PAY" AS USED IN SECTIONS 39-1-35 AND 39-3-2
MEANS THE PAY OTHERWISE DUE THE EHPLOYEE BY THE PUBLIC ENTITY WITHOUT ANY REDUCTION FOR PAY RECEIVED
FROH MILITARY SERVICE.
As already commented upon in Point III, in the recent
General Session of the Legislature in 1979, the House of
Representatives rejected H.B. 18 which would have reduced
the pay entitlement of public employees of the State and
its subdivisions during periods of military leave from
"full pay" to only the differential between the military
pay and their regular full time pay.

(See Appendix for copy

of House Journal of February 9, 1979 detailing this action.)
Again, past precedent has been for public agencies of
the State to pay "full pay" to members of the National Guard
and the Reserve Components while in the status of military
leave.

The policy of the State of Utah since prior to 1965

has been to pay "full pay" in addition to any military pay
the employee receives and to grant eleven working days of
military leave to state employees.

(R. 37-38)

Appellant's reference in Point V of its brief to the
Militia Act of 1917, the Amendment of 1919 and to present Sections 39-1-51 and 39-1-52, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the
various prohibitions regarding double payment demonstrate

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a basic misunderstanding of what the

egislature intended
I

by these sections.

The Legislature was merely making referer.j

to the fact that when the National Guard or "militia" was in

I

a status where payment was made for their service by the

I

federal government, no state payment for that service was
to be made.

This is the distinction between "state duty"

and duty in a federal "active duty for training" status
which has long been recognized.

Nearly all National Guard

service and active duty is on a regularly scheduled basis
and is conducted under provisions of 32
504.

u.s.c.

502, 503 or

Payment is made for this service by the federal govern·

ment.
On infrequent emergency situations the National Guard
may be called into state service for such emergencies as
fire, floods or insurrection.

In these instances they

would be compensated by state funds.
of the sections cited by appellant

Thus the prescription
is to guard against

double payment when the guard is in a federal status.

It

has nothing to do with an employee of the State who is grante'
military leave pay as an inducement to belong to a reserve
component.
That the Legislature understood the distinction between
double pay for service and mi 1 i tary leave pay for state ern·
ployees is obvious since the same Legislature enacted both
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Sections in 1917.

(Section 43, Chapter 99, Laws of Utah

1917 and Section 27, Chapter 99, Laws of Utah 1917, respecti ve1y. )
Thus, Appellant's argument is totally frivolous and
should be rejected.
As pointed out previously, the policy of the State of
Utah and all cities and counties who have paid military leave,
historically has been to pay the employee his "full salary"
for that time involved in annual training referred to variously
as "su.'lli!\er camp," "annual encampments," "active duty for training," etc., up to a maximum of 15 days annually.

Traditionally,

this payment has not been reduced, as Appellant urges, to reflect the pay differential between "full" military pay and pay
due from the employer.

This universal interpretation by public

agencies generally of the plain statutory language is reasonable and should be strongly considered by this Court in reviewing this matter.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the ruling of the District Court granting Respondents' Hotion for Summary Judgment
should be sustained by this Court.

The provisions of Sections

39-1-35 or 39-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, do not conflict
and it is apparent that Section 39-3-2 was intended to amplify
and extend the benefits of military leave to members of reserve

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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components generally rather than only to State employees
belonging to the National Guard.
Respondents further submit that Wasatch Front Regional
Council is an organization of cities and counties and enjoys no immunity from the lawful obligation of cities and
counties to pay military leave pay to its employees who
belong to the "organized reserve."
Respondents therefore urge this Court to finally declare
that Appellant must compensate Respondent John Ray acEvilly
and others similarly situated for their full pay otherwise
I

due during periods of military leave in addition to any mil1·l
tary pay entitlement.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
By/

PAUL COTRO-MANES f~ 7~
Attorney for McEvilly

_.

-C>---~
/ - /1 /;; ~ '-(
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LELAND D . FORD
\,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Respon
dents 1 Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Harold G.

Chns,

and Paul C. Droz, Attorneys for Appellant, 700 Continental
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this 9th day of July,
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(PAY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY SERVICE)
1979
GENERAL SESSION
4

Substitute
H.

B. No.

18

By

Lee W. Farnsworth

7

8

AN

ACT

9

AMENDING

SECTION 39-1-35, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AND

SECTION 39-3-2, UTAH CODE

ANNOTATED

1953,

AS

ENACTED

BY

10

CHAPTER

11

EMPLOYEES

IN

12

EMPLOYEES

IN THE MILITARY SERVICE SHALL HAVE THEIR MILITARY

13

PAY, EXCLUSIVE OF ALLOWANCES, SUPPLEMENTED ONLY UP TO

14

FULL

63,

LAWS

OF

UTAH

MILITARY

REGULAR

SALARY

1955; RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL

SERVICE;

PROVIDING

fHAT

STATE

15

PER YE.\R; PRS:l!BITHJG DECUCTION OF VACATION

16

SPENT ON ACTIVE DUTY; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE

17

FOR

TIME

Section

1.

Section 39-1-35, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is

amended to read:

25

If

26

guard

27

the Un1ted States,

of

this

the

nat1onal

state 1s called Into the serv1ce of the state or
the state shall prov1de for the dependents

29

st~te

29

called 1nto serv1ce.

30

exam1nat1~n

of

emplJyees who are enlisted members of the nat1onal guard so

tJ

be

The board of exam1ners

::jr:~.ndfat~e!:',

shall

cause

an

made 1nto the mer1ts of all cases of alleged
th2.t

-::e~·.:>nclenc::

l'

TIME

Be 1t enacted by the Leglslature of the State of Utah:

18
19

THEIR

FOR ALL TIME NOT IN EXCESS OF 15 DAYS

:j'randmother, wt..:e.

mother,

father,

s1ster, brother or child of such
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Substitute
H.

B.

18

No.

member of the nat1onal guard, or
4

dependent

any

or

either

of

dependent, and

to

any

on the state treasurer for

such sum in favor

determined dependents, payable out of

of

such

specific

and

9

for military purposes or for the maintenance and support

10

national
pay for

12

and

such

shall cause the state auditor to draw his warrant

8

11

are

upou such member for support, the board of examiners

shall determ1ne the amount to be pa1d by the state
6

them,

guard.

If

by

of

the

there are not sufficient funds available to

the necessary support of all the

specified

any amounts available

the

board

dependents

determined

of exam1ners, the funds available

13

shall be prorated among the dependents specified by the board

14

examiners.

15

be paid to such dependents may provide for a payment on a

The

monthly

16

or

17

each particular case.

18
19

Sect1on

of

board of exam1ners in specifying the amounts to

basis

2.

weekly

and on such condit1ons as it may deem best in·

Sect1on

39-3-2,

Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

enacted by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah 1955, is amended to read:

20

39-3-2.

All state employees and all employees of any county

21

and munic1pal1ty thereof who are or shall become members

22

organized reserve of the Un1ted States

of

the

ta~My;-Aavy;-a~f-€eEee-as8

23

~af~Res]

2~

state,

25

exclusive of allowances for hous1ng and subsistence, supplemented

armed forces,

shall

to

lncludinq

the

[se-a±±ewea-!~±±-!'ay]

thelr

full

nat1onal

guard

of

this

have theu base milituy pay,

26

uo

27

[!•fteeR]

regular salary for all t1me not in excess of

28

r1fle

29

training and 1nstruct1on requirements of

l2 days per year

spent on duty at annual encampment or

competition or other dut1es 1n connection with the Reserve

30

fetee--aR6--ffiaftRes]

31

the nat1onal

32

add1t1on

to

~uard

the

[aE~y;--RaYy;--a%f

armed forces of the Un1ted States including
of

thlS

state.

Th1s

annual vacat1cn leave Wlth pay.

leave

shall

be

1n

State employees of

33

':he na':.:...onal :Juard of thls state ·..,.ho spend t1me on act1ve duty in

34

~~~nrleCtton

~1th

Jther dut1es of the nattonal guard not 1n ser?lCe
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~
t:

H.

B.

No.

18

shall not have that add1t1onal t1me deducted
4

those

employees

section
6
7

shall

may
apply

be
only

entitled
to

to.

from

any

vacation

The provisions of this

enl1stments

and

reenlistments

following June 30, 1979.
Section 3.

This act shall take effect July 1, 1979.

-3-
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1 L!-:>

j

;u·Lioll.

COM:\IITTEE REPORT COIWECTION
February 7, 1!J7!J
Mr. Speal<er:
Your Committee on Business, Industrial Development and
Consumer Concerns, to which was referred H.B. No. 18, by Mr.
Farnsworth, ct al. PAY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN MlLITAll.Y Sl~RV!CE, hns cnrdully con.,idcrcd said bill ""rl
rPcommencls that it be deleted in title ancl body and Substitute
1
1.11. No. IH be inserLL·d in lieu thereof' and reports the same out
favorably.
SHERMAN D. llARMf<:R
Chairman
lteport filed.
On motion of Hepresentutive Harmer, the report of the
Business, lndustrinl Dl'velopmcnt and Consumer Concerns
Com1niLlee w:ts adopted.
::iuh»Litute ll.U. No. lH read the second lime by short title,
lrl'fer to Day :lt, Page ;,:2) Substitute H.H. No. JR was reported in
crrur.

CONSIDEHATION OF BILLS
ON THIRD READING

H.B. No. 1 R, I'!\ Y FOH PURLIC EMPLOYERS· MILITARY
!Tdd Lhc third Linle '"'cl )Jiacecl units l'inul passuge.

SJ•:J(VJCI-:

H.B. No. Hl then failecl on lhe following roll call:

~

Yeas, 22; J'iays, 18; Absent or not voting, 5.
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!lOUSE JOUI\Ni\L

Those voting

111

Atwood
Brockl>ank
Brown
Christiansen
Evans
F;nnsworth
Gardner
Garff

u

the affirmative were: Ktprcsentativcs:
Harrison
Humberstone
McAllister
McKeachnie
Mecham
Olsen
Pace

Pnln·.er
Richctrds
Rogers
Rowe
Saunders
Schmutz
Wilcox

Those voting in the negative wet·e: Representatives:
Allred
Arrington
Bangerter
Cannon
Christensen
Davis
Dmitrich
Doane
Florez
Fox
Free
Garr
Harmer
Harward
Hawkes
Heslop

Holbrook
Hollingshaus
Irvine
Johnson
Jones
Jorgensen
Judd
Leavitt
LeFevre
Livingston
McMullin
Money
Nielsen
Peterson, c.
l'etcrson, G.
Peterson, L.

Rnw::;on

Redci
!{eese
Sellcneit
Smith
Starr
Stepnens
Strong
Sykes
Taylor
Wahlstrom
White, J.
White, B.
Whitesides
Wimmer
Speaker Hansen

Absent or not voting: Representatives:
Bishop
Knowlton

Parkin
Patterson

Watt

H.B. No. 18 filed.

H.B. No. 88, EDUCATIONAL CEHTIFICi\TES, read the
third time and placed on its final passage.
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